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Statistics,  California  State University,  Los Angeles This  article  analyzes  the  theoretical  foundations  of 
industrial  organization  studies  of  monopolistic  and  competitive 
pricing.  Our  analysis  will  focus  on  the  central  debates  of  the 
195Os, 196Os, and 1970s which  formed the theoretical  basis of the 
modern  industrial  organization  paradigm.  We  will  argue  that 
despite claims to the contrary, and often unknowingly, the majority 
of  these  studies  adopted  a  mixture  of  both  classical  and 
neoclassical  elements.*  We will  try  to  show  that  the  lack  of a 
firm theoretical  grounding  has led to three types of confusion  in 
this literature.  First, there is a lack of clarity concerning what 
measure  of  profitability  should  be  equalized  in  competitive 
equilibrium.  A debate  has developed  concerning  whether  the rate 
of profit,  total profit,  or the profit margin,  is the appropriate 
variable  to study.  Second,  the  industrial  organization  approach 
to monopoly and competition has never adequately resolved over what 
period of time profit-rate  differentials  must be studied.  In this 
regard,  Yale  Brazen's  criticism  of the short-run  nature  of early 
profit rate-market  structure studies is discussed.  Third, we will 
argue  that  from  a  classical  point  of  view,  firm  studies  of 
profitability  which  draw  conclusions  for industry  phenomena  have 
been  misguided.  Harold  Demsetz'  work  on  concentration  and 
efficiency  will  be  referred  to  as  an  illustration.  We  will 
conclude by questioning the practicability of a purely neoclassical 
*In this article we use classical to mean the concepts  of the 
firm,  industry,  and  competition  found  Smith,  Ricardo,  Marx,  and 
their current  elaboration. 
1 grounding  for industrial economists,  since they have been impelled 
to abandon  this approach  in their investigation  of reality. 
I.  Theoretical  Foundations 
In  order  to  understand  the  theoretical  basis  of  applied 
studies  of  monopoly  and  competition  we  will  first  consider  the 
classical  and  neoclassical  theories  of  price  as  comparable 
paradigms.  We will try to formulate the empirical guidelines  that 
each theory  offers  the applied  economist.  When  approaching  the 
neoclassical  view  we  will  consider  it  through  the  eyes  of  the 
industrial  organization  field,  which  has  tried  to  modify  its 
understanding  of neoclassical  economics to make it more applicable 
to empirical  research. 
A.  Classical  Theory 
The  classical  analysis  of  prices  has  been  described  by  a 
number  of authors  (Eatwell, 1982; Dumenil  & Levy,  1984; Clifton, 
1977;  Semmler/Flaschel,  1985,  Shaikh,  1978).  According  to  the 
classical economists,  in the competitive process there is a double 
mechanism which pushes industry profit rates toward equality in the 
long  run.  On  the  one  hand,  investors  move  capital  across 
industries seeking the highest rate of profit, and therefore expand 
the  supply  in those  industries  with  above-average  profitability. 
On the other hand, augmented supplies meet demand constraints which 
force  down  prices  and  profits.  The  same  process  can  work  in 
reverse  as well,  as capital  exits  low-profit-rate  sectors.  Such 
a  crossover  dynamic  process  has  been  modeled  in  a  number  of 
different ways and shown to converge to an equalized rate of profit 
2 (Dumenil & Levy, 1984; Semmler/Flaschel,  1985; Borrgio,  1984).  In 
the classics,  complete adjustment is described only as a long-term 
regulating  position,  since constant  perturbations  in the  economy 
transform  this  convergence  process  into  one  of  oscillation. 
Empirically,  the classical  expectation  would  be the  existence  of 
unequal  rates  of profit  at any  one time,  due  to the  continually 
present  oscillatory  deviations.  But  over  a  long-run  period, 
industries  should  have  equal average  profit  rates, which  largely 
wash  out the  short-term  fluctuations  and approximate  the uniform 
profit  rate consistent  with the long-run equilibrium  prices which 
act as "centers of gravity."  This view can be found in an explicit 
form  in Smith,  Ricardo  and Marx:  Smith  calls  this  the  "natural 
price;" Marx calls them "prices of production." 
Marx  developed  further  the  distinction  between  firm  and 
industry rates of profit.  In Marx's discussion,  competition  first 
establishes  a  single  uniform  price  for  each  industry.  Given 
different  cost  structures,  a  single  industry  price  implies  that 
firm  profit  rates  remain  heterogeneous.  The  process  of  the 
formation  of  prices  of  production  through  capital  movements 
equalizes  the  average  rates  of profit  between  industries,  i.e., 
rates  of profit  on the  average  conditions  of production  in each 
industry: 
What  competition  brings  about,  first  of  all  in  one 
sphere,  is the establishment  of a uniform  market  value 
and market price out of the various  individual values of 
commodities.  But it is only the competition  of capitals 
in different  spheres  that  brings  forth  the  production 
price  that  equalizes  the  rate  of profit  between  those 
spheres  (Marx, 1981, p. 281). 
3 However,  in Marx's view, a uniform price in each industry combined 
with  the  existence  of various  technologies  and  cost  structures, 
leads  to  the  logical  consequence  of an equalized  rate  of profit 
across  industries  coexisting  with  a  hierarchy  of  firm  rates  of 
profit  within  industries.  This  is the case which  the classicals 
believed  would  exist  empirically  because  of the  constant  process 
of unequal  firm innovation.  Thus, we can distinguish  between  two 
types of equilibrium  states.  The situation emphasized by Marx has 
been  labelled  Ilquasilt  equilibrium,  as  opposed  to  "full" 
equilibrium:  the  long-run  state  where  both  firms  and  industry 
profit rates are equalized  (Dumenil & Levy, 1984). 
If we begin with Smith and Ricardo and trace the development 
of  the  classical  paradigm  of  competition  through  Marx  (without 






expectations for a competitive economy which should guide 
work on monopoly  and competition. 
Capitalist  firms  respond  to  signals  from  differential 
profit  rates.  Other balance  sheet and income statement 
ratios  should  be  considered  as  secondary  regarding 
capital's  decisions  to invest. 
The movement of capital equalizes rates of profit between 
industries,  and to a much lesser extent, between  firms. 
At  any point  in time,  industry  profit  rates  should  be 
expected  to  be  unequal.  Thus,  a  classical  study  of 
competition must be long-run in nature.  According to the 
4 classics, only long-run industry average rates of profit 
should tend to be equal. 
B.  Neoclassical  Theory 
The  neoclassical  theory  of  the  firm  has  two  well-defined 
models  which  act  as  ideal  limits  for  the  analysis  of  actual 
markets:  the  perfectly  competitive  model  and  the  pure  monopoly 
model.  We summarize the features of each below. 
The core model of neoclassical  theory  is the static textbook 
parable of the firm in a perfectly competitive market.  Economists 
are  quite  familiar  with  this  model.  It  is used  to  instill  the 
neoclassical  9ision"  of a competitive  market  economy,  yet  it is 
seldom seriously investigated or used as the basis of applied work. 
In  this  model,  the  firm  is  assumed  to  be  operating  so  as  to 
maximize  profits  at  every  instant  of  time,  where  profits  are 
defined as total revenues, net of all costs  (including the cost of 
capital).  The  firm  is  an  economic  agent  which  purchases  the 
services of the factors of production and combines them to produce 
a homogeneous  output  (condition (i) for a competitive market).  It 
operates within an industry, defined as the collection of all firms 
which produce the same kind of output.  The number of firms within 
the  industry  is infinite,  or at least large enough  so that,  even 
in  the  presence  of  less-than-infinitely-elastic  market  demand, 
variations  in the level of output by any one firm do not affect  the 
5 market  price  of  the  good  (condition  (ii)  for  a  competitive 
market).3 
For  a  such  a  competitive  market  to  be  judged  perfect  we 
require  the  following  additional  properties:4  (iii)  perfect 
communication,  (iv)  instantaneous  equilibrium,  (v)  zero 
transactions  costs.5  When all these conditions  are fulfilled  for 
an  entire  perfectly  competitive  economy,  all  firms  earn  zero 
economic profits, since the presence of positive profits would mean 
that some reallocation  of productive resources  (by existing or new 
firms) could  improve the overall  efficiency  of the economy.  The 
latter is not possible in equilibrium if conditions  (i)  through  (v) 
hold. 
Neoclassical  economists are fully aware of the t'unrealitytl  of 
such a model of market behavior of firms.  They correctly maintain, 
however,  that scientific  knowledge  largely consists  of developing 
such  abstract  models  as  the  way  of  uncovering  the  fundamental 
structure  of reality: 
.  .  . this competitive  story represents  a limiting case of 
market  behavior  that  is  very  useful  for  economic 
3See Varian  (1984), p. 82. 
4See  Hirshleifer  (1988),  p.403.  The  distinction  between 
perfect  markets  (not  necessarily  competitive)  and  perfectly 
competitive  markets  follows  the  original  discussion  in 
Stigler(1957). 
5Condition  (iii) needs to be interpreted as including perfect 
foresight  (i.e., no uncertainty)  when  dealing  with  intertemporal 
equilibrium. 
6 analysis,  just as the study of a frictionless  system  is 
useful  for a physicist.6 
The real question,  however,  is not the legitimacy  of this kind of 
limit-case  analysis,  but whether  real  firms and markets  are more 
or less imperfect approximations  to this particular  ideal type, or 
instances  of an altogether  different  one. 
The polar  opposite  of perfect  competition  is pure monopoly. 
Here the firm equals the industry, so the industry demand curve is 
directly  perceived  by  the  firm.  As  is  well  known,  in  such  a 
situation  the  marginal  revenue  curve  lies well  below  the  demand 
(average  revenue)  curve.  This  means  that  the  profit-maximizing 
equation  of  marginal  costs  to  marginal  revenues  will  yield  a 
suboptimal  output  level  and  a selling  price  well  above  marginal 
cost.  This  model  thus  allows  for economic  profits  to  obtain  at 
equilibrium. 
While this model  is useful to show the efficiency  losses due 
to departure  from perfect  competition,  it is just as unrealistic 
as the  latter  for most  industries.  It requires  a single  seller 
free to set prices  at will, with no threat  of potential  entry by 
other firms. 
These  two  polar  cases--perfect  competition  and  perfect 
monopoly  --represent  the  core  models  to  which  industrial 
organization  economists  refer  as  their  starting  point  for  any 
%arian  (1984), p. 82. 
7 subsequent  static analysis  of market  structure.7  The question  of 
dynamic  behavior  is  not  explicitly  addressed  in  the  textbooks. 
Nevertheless,  any  attempt  at  empirical  investigation  forces  the 
researcher to operate under some assumptions about dynamic firm and 
market  behavior,  whether  the assumptions  are explicit  or not. 
C.  Statics  and Dynamics 
The most rigorous version of the model of perfect competition 
is Walras' model of general equilibrium, which received its highest 
formal expression  in Debreu  (1959).  In this version of the model, 
there  exists  a  unique  price  vector  which  uniquely  clears  all 
markets  (both present  and  future)  and  achieves  a  Pareto-optimal 
intertemporal  outcome.  A major weakness  of this model  is that it 
requires a mythical auctioneer  to discover this unique price vector 
before  any  exchanges  can  take  place.  Once  this  is  done,  all 
exchanges,  for time zero to infinity, take place on that basis. 
Thus  this  model  does  not  admit  of  any  dynamics  whatsoever: 
no exchanges take place until the  economy achieves equilibrium, and 
once  it does  all  exchanges  are  set  for all  time.  This  is even 
stronger than saying that a changing economy  is in equilibrium  at 
every  instant:  it  says  that  there  is  only  one  (intertemporal) 
equilibrium,  with  all  temporal  development  collapsed  into  it. 
Clearly this is too unrealistic  to even consider as the limit case 
for  actual  markets.  So  applied  economists  operate  with  a 
putatively  less  sophisticated  but  more  realistic  VVvision" of 
7E.g.,  see  Shepherd  (1979),  chapter  3,  and  Koch  (1980), 
chapter  2. 
8 dynamic  adjustment,  based  on  Marshallian  partial-equilibrium 
analysis. 
As is  well known, Marshall distinguished between short-run and 
long-run  equilibrium  in a  single  market.  Short-run  equilibrium 
typically  involves selecting the profit-maximizing  level of output 
for a fixed plant capacity, whereas long-run equilibrium allows for 
adjustment  of  industry  capacity.  The  implicit  dynamic  behavior 
from short- to long-run equilibrium  is as follows: 
1. 
2. 
If  price  >  minimum  average  cost  (profits  >  0),  then 
industry  supply  will  increase  until  price  =  minimum 
average cost. 
If  price  <  minimum  average  cost  (profits  <  0),  then 
industry  supply  will  decrease  until  price  =  minimum 
average cost. 
This model  of firm behavior  is more  realistic  and therefore 
resembles  more  closely  the  model  which  applied  economists 
implicitly  use in their work.  There are some well-known  problems 
with  it, however, due to the fact that the analysis  is confined to 
a single  industry.  This  leaves open the question  of whether  the 
adjustment  process  converges  once the  impact  on other  industries 
and their  feedback  effects  is taken  into account.  As things  now 
stand,  neoclassical  economics  is  left  with  a  grand  vision  of 
equilibrium  with  no plausible  story of how the economy  converges 
to  it,  and  a  small  vision  of  dynamic  adjustment  to  equilibrium 
9 which  is  incapable  of  specifying  toward  what  the  adjustment 
proceeds.' 
In spite  of these unresolved  problems,  the Marshallian  view 
of  dynamic  adjustment  is  the  one  most  economists  subscribe  to. 
Moreover--  although  this  is  not  a  necessary  consequence  of  the 
theory  --most  adherents  to this model  believe  that the  economy  is 
normally in long-run equilibrium.  Thus in this view the occasional 
external  shock  is  responsible  for  the  sporadic  cases  of 
disequilibrium.  Such shocks perturb  firms and markets  from their 
equilibrium  state,  after  which  there  is  a  damped  asymptotic 
convergence back toward the equilibrium position.  With respect to 
profits,  therefore,  this version  of the basic model  implies that- 
-occasional  short-run profits and losses notwithstanding--profits 
should equal  zero in the long run throughout  the economy. 
As  discussed  above,  the  firm  in  neoclassical  theory  is  an 
economic  agent which  seeks to maximize  gains by hiring  factors of 
production  and selling the resultant  output for more than it cost 
to obtain them.  In its purest form, the neoclassical  firm does not 
own any productive  assets  on which  it seeks to maximize  the rate 
of return;  rather,  it seeks to maximize  what  amounts  to economic 
rent by strategically  placing  itself in the proper market.  It is 
therefore no accident that the textbooks show this firm maximizing 
the total mass  of profits,  rather than any rate of profit  (i.e., 
'There has recently been a recognition  of this conundrum,  and 
an  attempt  to  bridge  the  gap  between  Marshallian  dynamics  and 
Walrasian  general  equilibrium  in Novshek  and Sonnenschein  (1987). 
10 the ratio of profits  to some measure  of assets). 
In Marshallian  short-run  equilibrium,  the plant  capacity  is 
fixed;  for  this  case,  therefore,  maximizing  total  profits  also 
means maximizing  the ratio of total profits  to  (fixed) productive 
assets.'  The dynamic  adjustment  process  to long-run  equilibrium, 
however,  is ruled  by  the  firm's  search  for profit  maximization. 
Once  the  amount  of  capital  is  free  to  vary,  profit-maximizing 
behavior  will  no  longer  be  equivalent  to  profit-rate-maximizing 
behavior.  In the  limit,  for  instance,  an expansion  opportunity 
which  is expected  to yield,  say, one million dollars with a three 
million  dollar  investment,  will  be passed  up  for one which  will 
yield  one million  and one dollars,  even  if the  latter  requires  a 
thirty million  dollar  investment." 
We  have  seen  that  the  only  theory  of dynamic  firm behavior 
that Neoclassical  theory  has consists of the transition  from short- 
to long-run  equilibrium.  The long run is defined by Marshall  as 
the time frame necessary to make all inputs variable.  However, the 
standard theory  is not a growth model,  so it specifically  assumes 
other  factors  to  remain  constant,  most  notably  the  level  of 
technology.  This has significant  consequences  for the theory. 
By assuming a constant  technology, it follows that the optimum 
plant size  (by extension,  firm size) is fixed.  This  implies that 
9Note,  however,  that--assuming  rising  marginal  costs  and 
positive  profits  --it  does  not  imply  maximizing  profit  margin 
(defined as price minus average cost). 
"We of course exclude the cost of capital  (i.e, some interest 
rate) from the expected  return level. 
11 the  long-run  adjustments  of  capacity  in  an  industry  take  place 
through  the  entry  and  exit  of  firms  (plants)  using  identical 
technology.  It  follows  that  when  profits  in  an  industry  are 
positive,  the  same level of profits  obtains  for all  firms  in it. 
And when  long-run equilibrium  is achieved, that is, when entry or 
exit no longer take place, profits  are zero for all firms in that 
industry.  In  Neoclassical  theory,  therefore,  there  are  no 
inframarginal  firms  earning  positive  profits  in  an  industry  in 
long-run  equilibrium.  This  unexamined  assumption  has  led  to 
confusion  in the  literature  when  contrasting  the  results  of firm 
and industry  studies, as we discuss below. 
D.  Theoretical  Comnromises  in Industrial Orsanization 
Faced  with  the  task  of  real  empirical  assessment  of  the 
competitiveness  of industries, but armed with a highly abstract and 
unrealistic  theory,  the  industrial  organization  field  early  on 
retreated  into the idea of "workable competition.1'  The notion of 
workable  competition  was  first developed  by J.B.  Clark  in 1940." 
The  idea  was  that  the  efficiency  results  of  the  perfectly 
competitive  model  could  be  retained,  while  the  more  unrealistic 
assumptions  could  be  relaxed  or  abandoned.  For  example,  an 
infinity of firms was replaced with a large number of firms who act 
"(Clark,  1940).  The contestable-markets  literature  is also 
an  attempt  to  replace  perfect  competition  with  an  alternative 
approach  which  yields  even  broader  results.  Spence  writes  that 
"the theory  is an attempt  to provide  a substitute  for the theory 
of  perfect  competition...  the  theory  replaces  price-taking  with 
rapid entry and exit'  (Spence, 1983, p. 982).  However,  Shepherd 
(1984)  argues convincinglythatthe  contestable-markets  assumptions 
are both  inconsistent,  unrealistic  and without  empirical  support. 
12 as  if they  face  a more  or  less  given  price.  Unfortunately,  as 
Sosnick  has  shown,  many  of  the  assumptions  of  a  workable 
competitive  industry, as they were developed by subsequent authors, 
were in conflict  (Sosnick, 1958).  In addition, no firm theoretical 
conclusions could be drawn without  the original extreme assumptions 
(Lipsey and Lancaster,  1956).  As a result,  industrial  economists 
often complain  of a lack of adequate theory when dealing with real 
markets  which  do not meet  the  criteria  of the models  of perfect 
competition  or pure monopoly: 
In  industrial  organization,  on  the  other  hand,  there 
exist no generally  agreed upon basic models  of economic 
behavior,  and  the  underlying  assumptions  are  often 
contested...  In  industrial  organization,  investigators 
simply do not have the same degree of confidence in their 
theoretical  constructs  as  exists  in  other  areas" 
(Comanor, 1971, p. 405,407). 
In  the  195Os,  in  order  to  formulate  empirically  testable 
hypotheses,  the  industrial  organization  field  bypassed  the 
neoclassical  notions  of  perfect  competition  or  workable 
competition,  in  favor  of  the  structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm.  This  framework  was  developed  as  an  inductive 
generalization  of purely descriptive  industry studies done in-the 
past  (e.g., Berle & Means, 1938, and case studies by Edward Mason's 
Harvard  group  during  the  late  30's  and  early  40's).  In  this 
paradigm, market structures  (primarily the degree of concentration 
and  barriers  to  entry)  and  conduct  (firm  strategies  regarding 
product  innovation,  advertising,  R  and  D,  etc.)  determine 
performance  (allocative and production efficiency).  This paradigm, 
it  was  hoped,  would  allow  relationships  to  be  established 
13 empirically,  thus  avoiding  the  problems  of  theoretical 
specification. 
Unfortunately,  the  structure-conduct-performance  paradigm 
cannot solve the problems  industrial organization  faces because  is 
still requires  implicit notions of the firm and its objectives,  of 
markets,  and  of competition.  Because  of the  lack of  realism  of 
these  concepts  in  neoclassical  theory,  applied  industrial 
economists have been forced to rely on ad hoc hypotheses which are 
in greater  agreement  with  economic  intuition  and actual business 
practices.  This practical approach to theory has unconsciously  led 
the industrial-organization  field back  to elements of the classical 
theory  of competition.  This  is the  contention  which  we wish  to 
demonstrate  below,  by  focusing  on  three  issues:  the  rate  of 
profit,  long-run dynamics, and the theoretical distinction  between 
firms and industries. 
II.  Differences  over the Proper Measure  of Profitability 
Profit-rate differentials have become a primary indicator 
of  allocative  inefficiency  and  have  been  related  to  market 
structure  in a large number of studies.12  Yet, there is simply no 
way to theoretically  derive the link between allocative  efficiency 
and  the  rate  of  profit  on  assets  within  neoclassical  economic 
theory,  if by  profit  we  understand  economic  profit  in excess  of 
imputed  interest.  As  is  well  known,  neoclassical  theory  only 
lZttProfit  rates,  at  least  in  stable  prosperity  or  mild 
recession,  have come to serve as a sort of thermometer  to evaluate 
market power."  (Weiss, 1971, p. 371.) 
14 establishes  a  link  between  monopoly  and  profit  margins 
(profits/sales),  where  the  latter  depends  on  the  elasticity  of 
demand  for the product. 
In neoclassical  theory, the existence of any economic profits 
in excess of all costs  (including the cost of capital services)  is 
incompatible with the efficient allocation of resources which only 
obtains  in perfect  competition.  This  is due to the neoclassical 
view  of  firms as  I'...  essentially  brokers  between  resource  owners 
and consumers.  ItI3  In this view, the rate of return on capital  (the 
rate  of  interest)  is equalized  throughout  a competitive  economy. 
However  there  is no concept of the profit  rate as profit  relative 
to  some  asset  value,  since  capital  in the  neoclassical  view  is 
simply another factor of production whose services are hired.  The 
equalization  of  rates  of profit  between  industries  is therefore 
explicitly  treated  only  in  classical  economic  models. 
Nevertheless,  as we  shall  see below,  this notion  keeps  intruding 
into the debates  in the industrial organization  literature. 
After  the  second  World  War,  the  focus  in  industrial- 
organization  studies  switched  from  specific  industry  studies  to 
statistical  tests  of an inter-industry  nature.  This was done  in 
an attempt  to  establish  general  relationships  between  industrial 
structure  and  performance.  Probably  the  most  influential 
pioneering  article of this type was Joe Bain  (1951).  Bain's  1951 
article  introduced  the  study of profit  rate and market  structure 
13Stigler (1957). 
15 as an approach  to monopoly  and competition.  Bain's model  of the 
economy's  dynamic behavior  is for the most part of unacknowledged 
classical  origin  and  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
However,  he does  subscribe  to the conventional  neoclassical  view 
that firms seek to maximize the total mass of economic profits, not 
the rate of return on their own assets: 
The assumed motive... [of firms] is to maximize aggregate 
profits,and  not average equity rates.  Higher  aggregate 
profits,  in a given  demand  and  cost  situation,  give  a 
higher...  excess profit rate on sales  than  lower aggregate 
profits associated with lower prices, but not necessarily 
a  higher  equity  rate  if  the  equity-sales  ratio  is 
sufficiently  lower in the low-aggregate-profit  case.14 
Although  Bain  actually  measures  the  profit  rate  on  equity,  he 
argues  that  this  is used  only  as  a proxy  for profit  divided  by 
sales.  And  it is the  latter which  is the appropriate  measure  in 
his view,  because  monopoly  power  is seen as the ability  to raise 
unit price above costs.  Thus, the size of the profit-sales  ratio 
is in turn a proxy measure  of the degree of monopoly  power. 
Bain  constructed  his  study  as  a  cross-sectional  regression 
between  concentration  ratios  and profit  rates  for the  average  of 
the  years  1936  to  1940.  Although  he  found  only  a  weak  (but 
statistically  significant)  relationship,  he  concluded  that 
collusive  activity must be preventing  the  (classical) competitive 
process  from occurring. 
A second major study of competition and monopoly which focused 
on  profit  rate  and  market  structure  was  carried  out  by  George 
14Bain (1951), p. 297. 
16 Stigler  in 1963.  As mentioned  earlier, Stigler does not consider 
the classical  analysis  of competition  to be a distinct  paradigm, 
but  instead  a  loose  description  of  reality  made  more  precise  by 
later neoclassical  work.  Thus, Stigler discusses "economic theory" 
in  general  in his  methodological  sections.  With  regard  to  the 
measure  of  profitability  which  is  equalized  in  competition,  he 
writes: 
There is no more important proposition in economic theory 
than  that,  under  competition,  the  rate  of  return  on 
investment  tends  toward  equality  in  all  industries 
(Stigler, 1963, p. 54). 
By rate of return Stigler means the rate of profit on total assets- 
a notion  of rate of return which  is classical.  Like Bain, rather 
than  actually  measuring  the  extent  to  which  industries  are 
gravitating  around an equal long-run average, Stigler is concerned 
to measure  the relationship  between  concentration  and profit  rate 
for  a  ten-year  average.  His  results  are  unimpressive  and  he 
concludes  against  a  strong  version  of  collusion-determined 
differential  profit  rates.  What  is interesting  for our purposes, 
however,  is the disagreement  between Bain and Stigler over what is 
the proper measure  of profitability  which  (a) should be equalized 
under competitive  conditions,  and  (b) should be used as a measure 
of monopoly  power. 
The Bain and Stigler studies are the most famous of the market 
structure/profit  rate studies and they initiated a huge literature 
on  the  topic.  This  literature,  in  general  followed  suit  in 
adopting the classical version  of competition,  although  there are 
17 many  subtle  differences  between  the various  authors.  Important 
among these is the study by Michael Mann in 1966, since this paper 
introduced  the  study  of barriers  to  entry  into  empirical  market 
structure/profit  rate  analyses.  Mann  also  explicitly  adopted  a 
rate of profit for his analysis.  Mann found a relationship between 
high-profit-rate  industries  (for  the years 1950-1960) and a complex 
set  of  variables  which  he  called  "barriers  to  entry."15  Mann's 
study is classical  in the sense that barriers to entry are also an 
important  part  of the classical  discussion.  Smith,  for example, 
cites  state  interference  and lack of information  as a barrier  to 
competitive  equilibrium  (Smith,  1965,  p.  61).  Marx  also  often 
discusses  nonreproducible  resources  as a barrier  to the free flow 
of capital. 
David Quails has been prominent  in the exception he has taken 
to  the  classical  notion  of  non-equalized  profit  rates  as  an 
indicator  of  monopoly.  According  to  Quails,  microeconomics 
requires  the  analysis  of excess profit  or unequal  profit  margins 
rather than profit rates, and he is critical of Bain and others for 
having introduced the concept of the rate of profit.  He writes for 
example: 
The consideration  that rates of return on equity may be 
inadequate  indicators  of  price-cost  margins  could 
conceivably  be an  important  limitation  of the previous 
studies.  All  the  theoretical  arguments developed by Bain 
in regard to the impact of concentration  and the height 
of  entry  barriers  on  resource  allocation  performance 
actually  relate  to the  relationship  of  long-run  price- 
15Barriers  to entry are defined as a combination  of economies 
of  scale,  product  differentiation,  capital  requirements,  and 
control  of scarce raw materials. 
18 economic cost margins to concentration  and entry barrier 
heights.  As  is well  known,  a ranking  of  firms  on the 
basis  of  accounting  profit  rates  on  equity  would  not 
necessarily  correspond  to  a  ranking  of  firms  based  on 
excess or economic profit rates on sales...(Qualls,  1972, 
P-  148). 
Qualls  reran  the  computation  in the  Bain  and Mann  articles 
using  the  same  industries,  time  periods,  and  definitions  of 
concentration  and  barriers  to  entry,  but  against  profit  margins 
rather  than profit  rates.  His main  concern was  to study whether 
the same relationships  which  Bain and Mann  found would also hold. 
He  found  that  the  Bain  and  Mann  results  (a  weak  significant 
relationship  between  concentration  or  barriers  to  entry  and  a 
measure  of  the  profit  rate)  also  held  when  the  Itexcess  profit 
margin"  is substituted  for the rate of profit. 
In  the  classical  treatment  of  competition,  there  is  no  a- 
priori  appropriate  choice  of a definition  of the  rate of profit. 
Profit  can be  defined  broadly  or can be measured  after  taxes  or 
after net interest.  Capital can similarly be measured  in different 
ways  I  as  equity  or  total  assets;  it  can  include  or  exclude 
inventories, and can be measured at book value or replacement cost. 
What  is clear  in the classics  is that what  investors  maximize  is 
the  return on total investment,  for which the rate of profit  is an 
empirical proxy.  A whole range of uncharted waters concerning the 
best measure  of the rate of profit  exist.  But without  knowledge 
of this  issue,  it is impossible  to determine  whether  profit  rate 
differentials  are the result  of bias  in measurement  or some real 
economic  process.  These  issues have  only  begun  to be  addressed 
19 (see  Glick,  1985,  Dumenil,  Glick,  Rangel,  1986).  An  important 
obstacle  to  this  research  is the  idea  that  the  maximization  of 
total profits is the objective of firms, a view which is constantly 
finding  its way back  into the literature. 
III.  Long-Run versus Short-Run Periods 
Most  economists  doing  empirical  work,  following  Marshall, 
distinguish  between short-run and long-run equilibrium,  and expect 
the economy to be at least sometimes  in a long-run disequilibrium 
position.  A careful  reading  of the  literature,  however,  reveals 
the unacknowledged  presence  of classical  notions  of the short and 
long runs among the Marshallian discourse.  As discussed  in section 
I,  the  classical  view  of  long-run  equilibrium  is  that  it  is  a 
regulator  of  actual  market  conditions,  the  latter  fluctuating 
around  the  former, but never  converging  completely  to  it, due to 
the  constantly  changing  position  of  this  equilibrium.  The 
Marshallian  view was contrasted as one in which a disturbance  from 
equilibrium  (an exogenous  shock,  like a crop  failure)  leads to a 
gradual  return  to  equilibrium  conditions  in  a  smooth  monotonic 
convergence. 
In Bain's study we find an unclear mixture  of both views: 
The a priori model  from which the concentration-profits 
hypothesis  is drawn really refers to firms and industries 
in long-run  static equilibrium...  The predictions  drawn 
from this model may be extended to actual time-processes 
situations  by arguing that what would hold for long-run 
static equilibrium  should also tend to hold for average 
performance  over time, although with numerous sources p6f 
dispersion  from the central tendency  thus identified. 
16Bain (1951), p.306. 
20 By contrast, Stigler's view of competition  is one of industry 
profit  rates  gravitating  around  an  equal  center  of  gravity, 
although  he  never  distinguishes  his  (classical)  view  form  the 
Marshallian  one: 
The  role  of the word  VVtendencyt@  raises  further  issues. 
Economic  analysis  tells us that the rates  of return  in 
competitive  industries will be strictly equal (in  a sense 
to be noted  shortly)  in lona-run  eouilibrium,  that  is, 
after  a  period  long  enough  to  allow  (enough) 
entrepreneurs  to  move  to  the  industry  they  favor  and 
operate at the  rate of output  they  desire.  But this very 
concept  of  long-run  equilibrium  reminds  us  that,  in a 
world  where  all  events  are  not  perfectly  anticipated, 
there  will  be a stream  of unexpected  disturbances  that 
call  for  a  stream  of  changes  in  the  allocation  of 
resources:  unanticipated  shifts in consumers'  desires; 
the  impact  upon  international  markets  of  wars  and 
political  events; 
in technology, 
the irrec&ular  march of major  advances 
and others. 
Mann,  like  Bain  and  Stigler,  unconsciously  adopts  the 
classical  paradigm  of competition when discussing  price theory: 
The  emphasis  on  the  long-run  recognizes  that  actual 
profit rates may differ from normal in the short run for 
reasons  independent  of  the  number  of  sellers,  e.g., 
changes  in demand  or cost which  raise or lower profits 
until  the  allocation  of  resources  pushes  the  industry 
toward  long-run equilibrium  (Mann, 1966. p. 296). 
The precise  role of the long run in competition  was made an 
issue of contention  in this  literature  by Yale  Brazen's  response 
to  the  report  to  President  Johnson's  task  force  on  antitrust 
policy.18  Included in this report was the tRConcentrated  Industries 
Act"  which  would  have  given  authorities  a mandate  to  reduce  the 
market share of firms in concentrated  industries, and by doing so, 
17Stigler (1963), page 55. 
18See  the discussion  in Mueller  (1986), page 8-9. 
21 it  was  claimed,  increase  economic  efficiency.  As  evidence 
supporting this proposal, the Bain, Stigler, and Mann articles were 
primarily  referred  to.  Brazen's  argument,  embodied  in what  has 
become known as the "disequilibrium hypothesis," was that previous 
studies  linking  concentration  to profit  rates were  unfaithful  to 
their own theory.  Brozen criticized the short-run nature of these 
studies on the grounds that the equalization  of profit  rates is a 
long-run process.  Since only the classical  theory of competition 
is long-run  in nature,  Brozen was criticizing  this deviation  from 
classical  economics.  Specifically, his "disequilibrium hypothesis" 
maintained  that because of technological  change in some industries 
or the relative newness of a particular product, certain industries 
should be expected to have higher rates of profit than others.  By 
choosing a particular slice of time, researchers had been capturing 
only  a  phase  in  the  historical  evolution  of  industrial 
profitability  which  should eventually  converge toward an average. 
Indeed,  Brozen  was  taking  economists  to  task  for  simply 
stating the classical  hypotheses  without  taking them seriously  in 
the design of their studies.  He is very clear that, in the short- 
run,  profit  rate  differentials  should  exist  and  that  previous 
studies  had  not  captured  long-run  equilibrium.  However,  he  is 
unclear concerning the role of structural change and perturbation. 
It seems that,  in his view,  such disruptions  will  only result  in 
a temporary  disequilibrium  rather than a permanent  gravitation  as 
in the  classics.  Thus,  even  Brozen  vacillated  at times  between 
22 classical and Marshallian  characterizations  of the role of the long 
run. 
In order  to demonstrate his hypothesis, Brozen re-examined the 
data used  in the Bain, Stigler  and Mann  studies.  He argued  that 
if these studies truly captured a  relationship between profit rate 
and  collusion,  then  the  concentrated 
higher  than  average  profit  rates. 
disequilibrium  which is being observed, 
be  some  movement  toward  the  average. 
Brozen  found that: 
industries  should  sustain 
If,  however,  it  is 
than over time there should 
Concerning  the  Bain  data 
In the most concentrated half of Bain's list of forty two 
industries,  twelve  'earned'  above  average  (1953-1957 
average) rates of return in the period he examined.  Nine 
'earned' below average rates.  We would expect  rates in 
most above average return industries to decline,  if this 
was  a  disequilibrium  situation,  accounting  rates  of 
return are not differentially  biased,  and differentials 
in risks do not cause most  of the above  average  rates. 
Most  did.  They  declined  despite  the  above  average 
concentration  level.  Of the twelve above average return 
concentrated  industries, rates declined in nine and rose 
in three.  We would also expect most below average return 
industries  to  rise,  if  this  was  a  disequilibrium 
situation.  Most did.  Of the nine below average  return 
industries,  rates  rose  in  seven  and  declined  in  two 
(Brozen, 1969, p. 284-285). 
Brozen  also  found  the  same  type  of movement  among  the  low 
concentration  industries.  Most  of the above  average  rates  fell, 
while  most  of  the  below  average  rates  rose.  He  was  careful  to 
state  that  his  hypothesis  did  not  require  that  all  of  the 
industries  converge,  since a  certain degree of perturbation  could 
occur.  But he believed,  as a general  rule, that  large groups  of 
industries  should be expected to converge. 
23 Brozen recreated the same results on the Stigler and Mann data 
as well.  In both cases, he showed that when  the time period was 
extended there was a tendency toward profit rate convergence.  This 
convergence,  in both cases, weakened or eliminated the statistical 
significance of the  relationship found between market structure and 
profit  rates. 
In a defense of the deconcentration  proposal, MacAvoy, McKie, 
and Preston attempted to construct a subset of the Bain data which 
they  held  consisted  of  "high and  stable"  profit  rate  industries 
(MacAvoy, McKie,  and Preston,  1971).  If this nonconverging  group 
was related to concentration,  then the Brozen criticism might not 
be  generally  valid.  Such  a  relationship,  to  some  extent,  was 
found.  Brozen, however,  replied by again demonstrating  that even 
this  smaller  sample  of  high  profit  rate  industries  tended  to 
converge  over time.  Since the sample never  actually  reached  the 
average  level,  the  debate  culminated  in  a  difference  of 
interpretation.  Nevertheless, the Brozen point was  well made.  The 
industrial  organization  literature  had  adopted  the  long-run 
classical  point  of  view,  but  they  had  not  remained  faithful  in 
their methodology  by adopting  short-run  regression  methods  (cross 
sectional  regressions  using one to five year averages). 
In subsequent  work  on profit  rate and market  structure,  the 
Brozen criticism  seems to have been lost.  The notion that  in any 
single point  in time disequilibrium  will prevail has been  largely 
ignored, as contemporary market structure/profit  rate studies have 
utilized  more  sophisticated  econometrics  and  greater  industry 
24 detail,  but  they  have  not  abandoned 
regression  analysis.  Unfortunately, 
applied economists have followed up the 
long-run equilibrium.  Such a criticism 
short-run  cross-sectional 
neither  Brozen  nor  other 
insights gained concerning 
would have never even been 
necessary  within  a  self-conscious,  classically-informed  applied 
research  program,  since  the  concept  of  gravitation  necessarily 
implies long-run measurements. 
IV.  Firm versus  Industry Profitability 
A  last  confusion  in this  literature  is the  lack  of a clear 
understanding  of the different roles played by firms and industries 
in  competition.  As  mentioned  above,  the  classicals,  and  in 
particular Marx, are quite explicit concerning this point.  General 
equilibrium theory often treats the two in an identical manner, and 
in the empirical  literature the issue often lacks clarity.  Harold 
Demsetz, for example, has 
relationship  is a natural 
firms,  and therefore,  is 
for example,  that: 
argued that  the profit-rate concentration 
result of the greater efficiency of large 
not an effect  of collusion.  He writes, 
It is important to note, however, that there are reasons 
other  than  undesirable  market  power  for  expecting  a 
positive  correlation  between  profit  rates  and 
concentration.  Some  market  concentration  and  some 
correlation  of concentration with rates of return should 
be expected from a workable incentive system that rewards 
superior  performance.  Patents,  copyrights,  et cetera, 
are likely to produce  such a correlation  as a result of 
socially  desirable  superior  performance.  Superior 
abilities in lowering cost or in improving products, even 
when  unpatented,  are  also  likely  to  ,yield  such 
correlation  for nontrivial  periods of time. 
19Demsetz (1973a), pages  19-20. 
25 In  order  to  show  that  this  was  the  case,  Demsetz  examined  the 
correlation between concentration  and rates of return of large and 
small  firms.  In particular,  he showed that  although  large  firms 
in concentrated  industries  tended  to  have  high  rates  of  return, 
smaller  firms did not. 
No  positive  correlation  between  rates  of  return  and 
concentration  seems  evident  for firms under  50,000,OOO 
dollars  in  asset  size,  and  the  smallest  asset  size 
classification  under  500,000 dollars,  shows evidence  of 
a negative  correlation.20 
Demsetz  also  found  that  the  change  in  concentration  was 
related to the change in large-firm profit rates but not to small- 
firm rates of return.  He concluded  that this  is a result  of the 
fact  that  more  efficient  large  firms  tend  to  increase  industry 
concentration.  Thus,  superior  performance  of large  firms led to 
both higher  rates of return and concentration.  But here he means 
higher  industry  rates of return.  Such a proposition  is contrary 
to  the  classical  analysis.  As  was  already  argued  in the  first 
section, it may be the case that large efficient firms can increase 
their market  share and therefore  the degree of concentration  in a 
particular  industry,  but  for  "non  trivial  periods  of  time" 
(Demsetz)  such  a  situation  can  not  be  responsible  for  higher 
industry  rates  of profit.  Superior  performance  of an individual 
firm increases  its rate of return,  according  to the classics,  at 
the  expense  of  other  firms  in the  same  industry,  but  it cannot 
raise  the  entire  industry's  rate  of  profit.  Demsetz'  own  data 
201bid.,  page 20. 
26 shows this,  since  industries  whose  large  firms had higher  profit 
rates  showed  no  increase  in  industry  rate  of  profit.*'  This 
perplexed  him: 
Since  a larger  fraction  of industry  output  is produced 
by  larger  firms  in  the  more  concentrated  industries, 
these  industries  should  exhibit  higher  rates  of return 
than  other  industries...[However]  in table  2,  industry 
rates of return are reduced  [to normal levels] even for 
concentrated  i*ndustries  in which large firms continue to 
perform  well. 
Within  a classical  perspective,  however,  this result  is precisely 
what would be expected. 
V.  Conclusion 
This article has critically reviewed an historical  segment of 
the industrial organization  literature on monopoly and competition 
to  make  but  a  single  point.  The  lack  of  realism  in  the 
neoclassical  paradigm  has  had  a  profound  impact  on  applied 
research.  Since neoclassical economics offered little guidance for 
empirical  applications,  applied economists  studying the processes 
of monopoly  and  competition  were  forced  to  combine  neoclassical 
theory with elements  from the older classical tradition.  However, 
since  the  adoption  of  the  classical  perspective  remained  only 
implicit,  no  strong  consensus  concerning  theoretical  foundations 
actually  developed.  Because  of this  absence  of a clear  theory, 
debates  concerning  what  should be equalized,  long-run  and short- 
run methodologies,  and firm versus industry equalization,  arose and 
*'Demsetz (1973b), table 2. 
**Demsetz,  op.cit. 
27 have,  to  some  extent,  obstructed  further  research  in this  area. 
If  this  view  is  correct,  then  it  follows  that  neoclassical 
analysis,  by  its  practice,  fails  the  test  of  operational 
significance.  Applied  research must not be seen as an autonomous 
enterprise,  but  should  affect  and  guide  progress  in theoretical 
economics,  as  well  as  influence  the  profession's  evaluation  of 
competing  theoretical  traditions. 
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